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Citizenship Rights for Immigrants: National
Political Processes and Cross-National
Convergence in Western Europe, 1980–20081
Ruud Koopmans, Ines Michalowski, and Stine Waibel
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fu¨r Sozialforschung (WZB)
Immigrant citizenship rights in the nation-state reference both the-
ories of cross-national convergence and the resilience of national
political processes. This article investigates European countries’ at-
tribution of rights to immigrants: Have these rights become more
inclusive and more similar across countries? Are they affected by
EU membership, the role of the judiciary, the party in power, the
size of the immigrant electorate, or pressure exerted by anti-immi-
grant parties? Original data on 10 European countries, 1980–2008,
reveal no evidence for cross-national convergence. Rights tended to
become more inclusive until 2002, but stagnated afterward. Elec-
toral changes drive these trends: growth of the immigrant electorate
led to expansion, but countermobilization by right-wing parties
slowed or reversed liberalizations. These electoral mechanisms are
in turn shaped by long-standing policy traditions, leading to strong
path dependence and the reproduction of preexisting cross-national
differences.
INTRODUCTION
Citizenship rights define the boundaries of and rules of access to the polity,
and the rights, obligations, and identities that tie states and citizens (Koop-
1 We are grateful for the extensive and constructive comments that we received from
our reviewers. We would also like to thank our colleagues at the Department of
Migration, Integration, Transnationalization at the WZB for their comments and sug-
gestions at various stages of this project. We also acknowledge the feedback we received
from colleagues during presentations of earlier versions of this article at the 2010 ASA
meetings in Atlanta and at the Council of European Studies conferences in Montreal,
2010, and Barcelona, 2011. Special thanks go to Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka,
not only for their comments, but also for generously sharing their new and as yet
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mans et al. 2005, p. 7). As such, they touch upon the core of what makes
a nation-state. Immigrants are as border-crossers not born into the political
community of their country of destination, and states therefore need to
formulate rules and conditions for how immigrants can acquire rights.
Many immigrants originate in countries that differ culturally and reli-
giously from the land of immigration and thus raise questions of cultural
identity and the conditions under which countries provide room for cul-
tural and religious traditions other than their own. The extension of rights
to immigrants is also relevant for the wider question of whether, under
conditions of economic and cultural globalization and the rise of supra-
national forms of governance, historical distinctions between nation-states
are eroding and a convergence of policies around shared global or regional
standards is occurring (e.g., Beck 1998; Held et al. 1999).
Immigrant citizenship rights, as we conceive of them, are not limited
to access to the nationality of the immigration country. They include the
rights of resident aliens, as well as rights extended to minority ethnic or
religious groups of immigrant origin, irrespective of their nationality
status. In this study, we analyze the evolution of these rights across 10
European countries during the period 1980–2008. Our aim is not to explain
why countries historically have different traditions of extending rights to
immigrants, as there are already a number of excellent studies that address
this question, which refer, among other things, to trajectories of nation-
building and the heritage of colonialism (Brubaker 1992; Howard 2009;
Janoski 2010). We take these historical differences as given and investigate
to what extent they have endured since 1980 and which factors can explain
expansions and restrictions.
Two strands of theorizing on immigrant rights can be contrasted (see,
e.g., Freeman 2006, p. 227). The first predicts cross-national convergence
toward greater inclusiveness because of the diffusion of supranational
norms and shared commitments of democracies to liberal principles. The
second emphasizes national political processes, in particular, path-depen-
dent policy traditions and electoral factors. As is often the case in theo-
retical debates, the two perspectives come in different variants and are
not always clearly demarcated from one another, and many authors com-
bine elements drawn from both of them (e.g., Botecheva and Martin 2001;
Heckmann and Schnapper 2003). Nevertheless, for heuristic reasons it is
useful to emphasize the distinctiveness of the two approaches, because
they imply different predictions regarding trends in immigrant rights and
identify different causal mechanisms behind change.
unpublished data on multicultural rights with us. Direct correspondence to Ruud
Koopmans, Department of Migration, Integration, Transnationalization, WZB, Reich-
pietschufer 50, 10785 Berlin, Germany. E-mail: koopmans@wzb.eu
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Although there is a broad literature behind the two perspectives, the
empirical verdict on their relative validity is as yet inconclusive. Much
evidence that has been advanced in favor of one or the other explanation
is based on one or a few countries, rarely compares the explanatory power
of rival perspectives directly, and is not based on a consistent and en-
compassing measurement of policies (Odmalm 2007). The only partial
exceptions that we are aware of are Janoski (2010), who, however, does
not focus on explaining policies but on an outcome of policies, naturali-
zation rates, and Howard (2009), whose analysis is restricted to natural-
ization policies, which as we argue is only one aspect of immigrant rights.
By testing hypotheses drawn from different theoretical perspectives across
10 countries, four points in time, and a broad set of indicators of immigrant
rights, we aim to provide a more systematic basis for this debate
In the next section, we discuss the two theoretical perspectives in greater
detail and derive hypotheses, regarding both descriptive trends and causal
mechanisms. Subsequently, we introduce the categories and dimensions
of immigrant rights that we distinguish. We then present our research
design and the operationalization of variables and assess the reliability
of our data. In the empirical part of the article, we describe the evolution
of citizenship rights in the 10 countries and test the explanatory power
of the causal variables that are emphasized by the two theoretical per-
spectives.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES
Theories of Liberal Convergence
Even within the European Union (EU), rules governing access to na-
tionality have remained a fiercely guarded prerogative of nation-states
(Checkel 2001; Vink 2001; Odmalm 2007). However, an important strand
of theorizing on immigrant rights contends that the importance of nation-
states’ clinging to de jure control over immigrants’ access to nationality
is more symbolic than substantive, as it is accompanied by de facto de-
nationalization through cross-national convergence of citizenship regimes
as a result of a shared commitment to norms of human rights and equal
treatment. The thesis of convergent immigrant rights comes in two var-
iants, depending on whether the sources of these norms are located pri-
marily on the supranational or on the national level.
The first variant of the convergence thesis has emphasized “postna-
tional” forces such as global human rights norms, international conven-
tions, and European directives that have made national citizenship, as
Soysal (1998, p. 208) stated, “no longer a significant construction” (simi-
larly, see Jacobson 1997; Sassen 1998; Faist 2000). These denationalizing
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pressures are seen as enabling immigrants to claim rights in areas such
as family formation, access to the labor market and welfare state ar-
rangements, religious freedoms, and protection by antidiscrimination pro-
visions irrespective of their nationality status. In this view, these civic
rights have become largely decoupled from citizenship-as-nationality, with
national-level voting rights as the only significant right that remains ex-
clusively reserved for nationals.
Representatives of the second variant are critical of the postnationalist
emphasis on supranational norms and institutions, but similarly predict
cross-national convergence toward more inclusive citizenship rights for
immigrants, at least among liberal democracies (e.g., Freeman 1995; Free-
man and Oegelman 1998; Hansen and Weil 2001). As Joppke (2004, p.
254) formulates it, “liberal nation-states are marked by a thorough de-
ethnicization, in which the various national labels are only different names
for the same thing, the liberal creed of liberty and equality. Prominent
expressions of this de-ethnicization are non-discriminatory immigration
policies, liberalized citizenship rules, and a general distancing from the
old idea of ‘assimilation.’” The verdict on the relevance of national
traditions of citizenship that the two versions of the convergence thesis
reach is much the same: “The notion of national models no longer makes
sense, if it ever did” (Joppke 2007, p. 2).
The convergence perspective makes two central descriptive claims
about trends in immigrant citizenship rights. The first is that changes
have gone toward more encompassing rights and away from cultural
assimilation requirements. The second is that country differences have
declined over time because of shared normative commitments that pull
countries toward liberalization. The strongest pull toward liberalization
should be felt in countries whose current policies are most removed from
respectively supranational norms or liberal-democratic principles. Pre-
viously restrictive countries should therefore be more likely to liberalize
immigrant citizenship rights than countries that already had liberal pol-
icies, resulting in cross-national convergence.
Where the postnational and domestic variants of the convergence per-
spective part ways is in the causal factors behind change that they em-
phasize. Since the EU is by far the most powerful system of governance
beyond the nation-state in the world today, we should, if the postnational
variant is correct, expect to see differences between EU member states
and nonmember countries (e.g., Meehan 1993; Wiener 1997). In the terms
of economic theories of convergence, we should find evidence that the
EU is a “convergence club” (Plu¨mper and Schneider 2009). Since the
supposed effects of postnational discourses and rights are toward more
equal rights and recognition of cultural pluralism, this implies that EU
membership should be associated with more inclusive citizenship policies.
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In contrast, the domestic variant predicts liberal convergence among
Western democracies because of internal mechanisms that enforce their
own liberal norms. Many studies based on this approach underline that
liberalization results from interventions of courts that uphold liberal legal
principles against the sometimes restrictive ambitions of the public and
policy makers (Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield 1994; Joppke 2001; Davy
2004; Kneip 2008). We should therefore expect countries with a strong
role of the courts in the policy process to have undergone more pronounced
changes toward inclusive immigrant rights than countries with a weak
tradition of judicial review.
Theories of National Political Processes
Theories emphasizing the resilience of national politics also come in two
variants, respectively emphasizing stable and volatile aspects of national
political processes. The first variant argues that countries are unlikely to
implement paradigmatic changes. This argument goes back to Rogers
Brubaker’s (1992) study comparing citizenship in France and Germany.
The assumption here is that there are a number of “models” or “regime
types” of citizenship that are clearly distinct and deeply rooted in national
history and political culture and therefore resistant to change over time.
In Brubaker’s words, “France and Germany continue to define their cit-
izenries in fundamentally different ways because they have been doing
so for more than a century” (Brubaker 1992, p. 186).
While Brubaker’s and other early “national model” arguments (Castles
and Miller 1993, pp. 223–29) were formulated in static ways, later vari-
ations on this approach have, partly under the impression of significant
recent changes in citizenship laws such as Germany’s new nationality law
of 2000, tried to reconcile the idea of systematic cross-national differences
with the empirical observation of changes over time (e.g., Howard 2005;
Koopmans et al. 2005; Howard 2006, 2009). This second variant retains
the idea that change takes place along paths circumscribed by national
citizenship traditions, but pays more attention to conjunctural political
process variables, particularly those related to electoral and governmental
configurations of power (Kriesi et al. 1995) that can explain extensions
and restrictions of immigrant rights over time.
Three such influences have been highlighted in the literature: govern-
ment composition, the strength of anti-immigrant parties, and the size of
the immigrant electorate. Bale (2008) has argued that mainstream right-
wing parties in government have often instigated restrictive changes in
immigrant rights, even if they were not under electoral pressure from far-
right competitors. Similarly, Hagedorn (2001) has argued that the out-
comes of citizenship reforms in Germany and France were not determined
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so much by national models as by the political orientation of governments.
Others, however, see mainstream parties of both the left and the right as
“broadly expansionist and inclusive” because of an “antipopulist norm”
and the influence of proimmigrant interest groups such as employers and
civil rights organizations (Freeman 1995, p. 881). In this view, liberal
policies will predominate as long as political elites succeed in depoliticizing
debates on immigrant rights (Guiraudon 1997). However, mainstream
parties have often not been able to control the political agenda over
immigration because of electoral competition from right-wing populist
parties (Perlmutter 1996; Schain 2006; Howard 2009). Electoral pressures
from parties of the populist right may however be counterbalanced by
the political leverage of immigrant voters (e.g., Ireland 1994; Freeman
1995; Soysal 1997). Postcolonial immigrants who held citizenship upon
arrival, naturalized immigrants, members of the second generation who
acquired citizenship through naturalization or jus soli, as well as foreign
nationals with voting rights (e.g., on the local level in several countries,
or for Commonwealth citizens on all political levels in the United King-
dom) may make up a significant percentage of the electorate, which may
lead mainstream parties to adopt liberal policies in order to capture the
immigrant vote.
Hypotheses
We derive two types of hypotheses from these theories. First, they make
different descriptive predictions regarding temporal trends and cross-na-
tional differences. Second, they specify different causal factors that should
explain these trends and differences. From the liberal convergence per-
spective, we derive two descriptive hypotheses, one about the liberalizing
direction of change, and one about cross-national convergence:
Hypothesis 1.—Citizenship rights for immigrants have moved toward
greater inclusiveness.
Hypothesis 2.—Cross-national differences in citizenship rights for im-
migrants have decreased over time.
Confirmation of hypothesis 2 would contradict theories that emphasize
national path dependence. Confirmation of hypothesis 1 is, however, not
necessarily in contradiction with an emphasis on national political pro-
cesses, because liberalization is a possible outcome if conducive national
political factors (left-wing parties in government, a large share of immi-
grant voters) outweigh the forces that push toward greater restrictiveness
(right-wing parties in government, strong right-wing populist parties).
However, this does not imply that any directional pattern of change would
be reconcilable with this perspective. The idea that institutional traditions
matter implies that change should occur along circumscribed paths and
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will not result in fundamental changes in the relative positioning of coun-
tries. Therefore, the following hypothesis follows from theories that em-
phasize national political processes:
Hypothesis 3.—There is strong continuity in national policies on im-
migrant rights and the relative positioning of countries will be relatively
stable over time.
Note that hypothesis 3 is not the mirror image of hypothesis 2. Rejection
of hypothesis 2 means that cross-national differences remain of a similar
magnitude, but it leaves open the possibility that the countries that were
the most inclusive at one point in time have become very restrictive
compared to other countries at another point in time, and vice versa.
Confirmation of hypothesis 3 requires that countries’ relative positioning
should display a high degree of stability over time. Confirmation of this
hypothesis would, however, not necessarily contradict the liberal conver-
gence thesis, as few adherents of this perspective would claim that national
policy traditions do not matter at all. A combined confirmation of hy-
potheses 2 and 3 (a declining magnitude but a similar qualitative pattern
of cross-national differences) would therefore be reconcilable with the idea
of liberal convergence.
Thus, the descriptive hypotheses alone are not sufficient to compare
the validity of the two perspectives. We need to look in addition at the
causal mechanisms that the two perspectives highlight. The two variants
of the liberal convergence perspective differ in this regard, the one em-
phasizing—in the European context—the effects of membership in the
EU, the other the role of domestic courts:
Hypothesis 4.—Trends toward liberalization and cross-national con-
vergence are strongest among EU member countries.
Hypothesis 5.—Countries with strong courts have more strongly lib-
eralized immigrant rights than countries with a weak tradition of judicial
review.
Because courts are part of a country’s institutionalized system of checks
and balances, one might argue that rejection or acceptance of hypothesis
5 also affects the validity of theories on national political processes. This
is, however, not the case because hypothesis 5 is about the impact of
strong courts on the direction of change, not about the magnitude of the
courts’ role in the policy process. The argument of the liberal convergence
thesis that the hypothesis tests is that national constitutions and liberal-
democratic legal frameworks exert normative pressures toward liberali-
zation of immigrant rights, which are enforced by the courts. The national
political process perspective would predict that courts play a more im-
portant role in countries where they have greater powers of policy review,
but not whether this would lead to more restrictive or more inclusive
policies.
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Our final three hypotheses refer to the conjunctural electoral factors
that are emphasized within the national political process perspective:
Hypothesis 6.—Changes in the direction of more inclusive immigrant
citizenship rights are more likely when left-wing parties are in government.
Hypothesis 7.—Changes in the direction of more restrictive immigrant
citizenship rights are more likely when populist parties of the far right are
strong.
Hypothesis 8.—Changes in the direction of more inclusive immigrant
citizenship rights are more likely when immigrants and their direct de-
scendants make up a significant share of the electorate.
CATEGORIES AND DIMENSIONS OF IMMIGRANT CITIZENSHIP
RIGHTS
Immigrants have different statuses, and rights may vary across them.
Undocumented immigrants have very few rights at all, although they may
have access to fundamental services, such as health care and schooling
for their children. Asylum seekers fall under a specific set of regulations,
which give them access to most basic services, but as long as they are
not recognized, they often cannot freely move and are not allowed to take
up employment. Once recognized, however, they may have privileges that
other immigrants do not enjoy, such as full protection against expulsion
or facilitated immigration rights for spouses. The most privileged group
of immigrants within our countries of study are those from member states
of the EU, who are free to settle and work in other member states. Even
the two non-EU member states within our sample—Norway and Swit-
zerland—have association agreements with the EU that offer immigrants
from EU countries privileged rights. Moreover, EU immigrants have vot-
ing rights in local and European elections in other member states.
These variations imply that it is crucial to control for differences across
immigrants of different statuses. We therefore focus in this study on the
rights of immigrants (regardless of their nationality status) from outside
the EU who do not belong to the special categories of undocumented
migrants, asylum seekers, or refugees. This implies that the rights we
analyze exclude those that are constant for the category of immigrants
that we are interested in, such as access to health care, schooling, or the
right to take up employment. A complete comparative analysis of im-
migrant rights would also have to account for other categories of immi-
grants, but this is beyond the scope of this article. Many of the rights we
analyze apply, however, to immigrants regardless of their status, at least
to those with legal residence (e.g., cultural rights, antidiscrimination pro-
visions, nationality acquisition).
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A drawback of earlier cross-national studies is that they focused largely
or exclusively on one dimension of rights, namely, the degree to which
immigrants are granted individual equality. Central to such studies are
the criteria for nationality acquisition; regulations for residence; differ-
ences between the political, labor market, and welfare rights of aliens and
nationals; and antidiscrimination provisions, which are also relevant for
immigrants who have naturalized. However, controversy over immigrant
rights has increasingly focused on so-called “multicultural rights,” which
likewise are relevant for both naturalized and nonnaturalized immigrants.
Central here is not the question whether immigrants should have the
same individual rights and duties as nonimmigrants, but whether cultural
and religious minorities should have special rights, exemptions from ex-
isting regulations, and state support for their organizations and institu-
tions. Some of these rights are based on preexisting arrangements for
native minorities, for example, the right to found religious schools; others
are meant to compensate immigrant minorities for cultural biases in ex-
isting institutions and legislation. Included in this category are rights
related to language, the accommodation of religious dress and customs,
recognition of separate institutions in areas such as education and the
media, and representation and consultation rights for ethnic and religious
associations.
These cultural aspects of immigrant rights have dominated debates on
immigrant rights in political philosophy (e.g., Kymlicka 1995; Young 1998;
Benhabib 2002) and have also received much attention in qualitative
empirical studies (e.g., Laurence and Vaisse 2006; Maussen 2009). How-
ever, we are aware of only two systematic cross-national comparisons of
the cultural dimension of citizenship rights. Banting and Kymlicka’s
(2004) study, while including the ten countries of the present study, is
limited to one point in time and therefore does not allow answering the
process-oriented research questions we ask. Koopmans et al.’s (2005) study
allows a diachronic perspective, but includes only five countries, and
moreover does not cover the period after September 11, 2001, in which
multicultural rights for immigrants have come under increasing pressure
(Bleich 2009).
Because of the importance of cultural and religious rights, we use Koop-
mans et al.’s (2005) two-dimensional approach in this study. This means
that we distinguish between, on the one hand, rights that are attributed
to the individual immigrant, which can tend toward either an ethnic or
a civic-territorial understanding of citizenship, and, on the other hand,
cultural and religious rights that apply to the immigrant because of his
or her belonging to a particular ethnic or religious group, tending toward
either a monocultural or a culturally pluralist understanding of citizenship.
The latter dimension also includes cultural requirements, such as language
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knowledge or cultural assimilation, which an immigrant must meet as a
precondition for access to certain rights. Countries that score high on the
dimension of individual rights provide easy access to nationality, encom-
passing protection against discrimination, and offer similar rights to cit-
izens and aliens. Countries that score high on the cultural difference di-
mension make few cultural assimilation demands for access to rights,
allow expressions of cultural and religious difference in public institutions,
incorporate ethnic and religious organizations in political decision making,
and facilitate separate institutional arrangements for minorities in insti-
tutions such as schools and public media.
In addition to this theoretical classification, we make a distinction be-
tween eight substantive policy fields, which partly cross-cut the theoretical
dimensions: (1) nationality acquisition; (2) marriage migration rights (i.e.,
the conditions under which a resident migrant can sponsor a marriage
partner from abroad); (3) protection against expulsion; (4) antidiscrimi-
nation provisions; (5) access to public service employment; (6) political
representation rights; (7) cultural and religious rights in the education
system; and (8) other cultural and religious rights. Within each of these
policy fields, several more detailed aspects were investigated, covering a
total of 41 indicators. Table 1 shows which indicators were used for each
of the policy fields and theoretical dimensions.2 How these indicators were
coded is explained in the next section. As the table shows, in the case of
religious rights, our indicators focus on Islam and Muslims. The reason
is that Muslims are by far the most important religious minority of im-
migrant origin in western Europe and are present in significant numbers
in all 10 countries of investigation. By contrast, rights for other religious
minorities such as Hindus or Sikhs are not a significant issue in many of
our countries.
RESEARCH DESIGN, DATA, AND OPERATIONALIZATION
We analyze the evolution of immigrant rights both cross-nationally and
diachronically. We compare across four points in time, 1980, 1990, 2002,
2 Numbers of mosques with minarets and Islamic schools standardized by the size of
a country’s Muslim population might be seen as outcome variables rather than as
rights. We have nonetheless included them because mosques and Islamic schools are
hotly contested in many countries even though—with the exception of Switzerland
after the minaret ban of 2009, which falls outside of our period of study—none of the
countries had formal bans on the construction of mosques with Islamic architecture
or the establishment of Islamic schools. However, the formal requirements that need
to be fulfilled—e.g., sufficient parking space, accordance with local zoning plans, suf-
ficient demand from parents—offer substantial leeway for authorities to obstruct or
facilitate mosques or Islamic schools.
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and 2008,3 and 10 western European countries: Germany, France, the
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Switzerland, Swe-
den, Denmark, and Norway, which have all been immigration countries
since the 1950s or 1960s. We focus on European countries, because ar-
guably denationalization tendencies have progressed further in Europe
than anywhere else in the world and Europe thus constitutes a useful
“laboratory” (Howard 2006, p. 446) for analyzing cross-national conver-
gence and the resilience of national policy traditions on citizenship rights.
Our sample includes two non-EU member countries (Norway and Swit-
zerland), as well as two countries that became EU members over the
course of our period of study (Austria and Sweden in 1995). Some studies
of immigrant rights include countries that have not yet experienced sig-
nificant immigration (e.g., countries in eastern Europe) or that have only
recently turned from emigration into immigration countries (e.g., Italy,
Spain, or Ireland), but we prefer to stick to a set of countries in which
immigrants form a significant part of the population and where the ques-
tion of immigrant citizenship rights has been on the political agenda for
sufficient time to have made a discernable impact on policies and legis-
lation. An additional, pragmatic reason to limit ourselves to this set of
countries is that the gathering of the information that we analyze is labor-
intensive and requires the consultation of sources that are mostly in the
various national languages, which already number seven for the current
set of countries.
Measurement of Immigrant Citizenship Rights
Rights on the individual equality dimension are mostly laid down in
formal legislation and entailed the study of laws and other legal texts.
Much of the information could be derived from secondary literature (in
particular, Baubo¨ck et al. 2006a, 2006b). The data collection for the in-
dicators of the cultural difference dimension was more difficult because
it has been neglected in earlier cross-national research and because these
rights are not always laid down in formal legislation and depend more
strongly on jurisprudence, administrative decrees, and local implemen-
tation practices. We therefore relied, besides available secondary litera-
ture, on information directly requested from ministries, immigrant or-
ganizations, and national experts, as well as from Web sites and newspaper
archives.
3 The choice of measurement years was partly made for pragmatic reasons. Data
gathering took place during 2009, and therefore 2008 was the most recent year for
which we could collect complete information. The year 2002 was taken because it
allowed us to draw on Koopmans et al. (2005) for some countries.
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We used the variation among countries as the standard of comparison
for allocating scores for each country-year combination. These scores all
range between 1 and 1. Depending on how fine-grained the distinctions
were that an indicator allowed, we distinguished two (1 and 1), three
(1, 0, and 1), or five score levels (1, 0.5, 0, 0.5, 1). Dichotomous
indicator scores were used for indicators that specified merely if a pro-
vision existed, for example, whether a civil law provision prohibiting racial
discrimination existed or not. Three categories specifically take into ac-
count that sometimes policy implementation is less dichotomous. For in-
stance, dual nationality may formally not be allowed, but some countries
allow generous exceptions, implying that in practice many immigrants
can retain their original nationality. For other indicators, we used the full
five scoring levels. The 1 score was always given to the country-year
combination or combinations that granted the least rights to immigrants
or implied the most severe restrictions within our sample. Conversely, the
1 score was given to the country-year combination or combinations that
granted the most rights or implied the least restrictions within the sample.
An example can illustrate how we proceeded. As table 1 shows, one of
our indicators for marriage migration rights is the minimum age of the
migrating spouse. The one extreme here is when there are no age barriers
at all, provided that the marriage is legal according to the legislation of
the country of origin. This defines the 1 score, which applied to almost
all countries in 1980 (with the exception of Belgium). The other extreme
is defined by Denmark, which in 2008 had an age limit of 24 years and
thus received the 1 score for this year. In between, we find legislation
with an age limit of 16 years (e.g., the United Kingdom in 1990 and 2002;
scored 0.5), of 18 years (e.g., Belgium in 1980 in 2008; scored 0), and
of 21 years (e.g., Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom in
2008; scored 0.5).
Full information regarding the criteria used to score each of the 41
indicators, the resulting scores for each country-year combination, as well
as the source materials that were used can be accessed online.4 Based on
these individual indicators, we calculated aggregate scores (which also
take values between 1 and 1) for the eight substantive policy fields
and the two theoretical dimensions by averaging across all the indicators
belonging to that set of rights.5 These aggregate scores form the basis for
4 Available at http://www.wzb.eu/files/mit/indicators.xls.
5 We avoided weights when calculating averages, as theoretical justifications for
weights are always difficult. There is one exception: the indicators for nationality
acquisition were given double weight in computing the averages for the two theoretical
dimensions. The reason to do so was that many other restrictions on immigrant rights
lose their relevance once an immigrant becomes naturalized. For instance, nationals
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our analyses below. Our units of analysis are country-year combinations,
giving us a total of 40 cases: 10 countries at 4 points in time.
Reliability
Indicator-based policy studies inevitably entail contestable choices. Al-
though the indicators we use are relatively detailed and encompassing,
they are not exhaustive, and therefore some may feel that we have over-
looked important aspects of immigrant rights. One may also argue that
our use of only up to five scoring levels is too crude. Further, there may
be a subjective element involved in judging whether a particular country-
year combination should be given a higher or a lower score on a given
indicator. Finally, because we had to rely on a variety of sources of in-
formation instead of one systematic measurement instrument applied in
a uniform way to all indicators, countries, and points in time, we run the
risk that others using different sources would have reached different con-
clusions.
We are in the fortunate position that several previous studies partly
overlap with ours. These earlier studies shared our goal of measuring
immigrant rights in cross-nationally consistent ways. However, they used
partly different indicators, scoring rules, and sources of information, and
of course different researchers to translate rules and information into
numeric scores. We compare our results to five other indicator-based stud-
ies: (1) the Legal Obstacles to Integration-Index (LOI; Waldrauch and
Hofinger 1997); (2) the Migrant Integration Policy Index 2006 (MIPEX;
MPG 2006); (3) the Multicultural Policies Index (MPI; Banting and Kym-
licka 2004); (4) the Citizenship Policy Index (CPI; Howard 2009); and (5)
the Barriers to Naturalization Index (BNI; Janoski 2010). With the ex-
ception of Howard, who compared the years 1980 and 2008, and Janoski,
who draws on four measurement points (1970, 1980, 1990, and 2002),
these studies cover only one point in time, which usually does not exactly
match our measurement points. In their published study, Banting and
Kymlicka’s (2004) indicators referred broadly to the 1980s and 1990s,
rather than to a specific measurement year. However, they have recently
extended their data, which now cover three data points: 1980, 2000, and
2010. We therefore compared our scores to Banting and Kymlicka’s new,
as yet unpublished data. To compare across studies, we take the mea-
surement years in our study that are closest to those of the other studies.
The MIPEX, MPI, and BNI indices include all 10 countries represented
in our study, whereas with the LOI and CPI indices there is an overlap
can no longer be expelled, and they have unrestricted voting rights and access to public
sector employment.
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of eight countries (LOI does not include Norway and Denmark; CPI does
not include Norway and Switzerland). In table 2, we report the corre-
lations between our Indicators of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants
(ICRI) and the results of these earlier studies.6 The correlations with other
studies are all fairly high, ranging from .69 to .94, with an average of .79.
Some of the difference with other studies is not due to reliability issues,
but to the fact that the measurement years do not coincide exactly. Given
these considerations, we find the average cross-study correlation of .79
satisfactory.
Independent Variables—EU Membership
There is a score of 1 for Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark; 0 for Switzerland and Norway; and
for Sweden and Austria, 0 in 1980 and 1990, and 1 in 2002 and 2008.
Power of Domestic Courts
We rely on Lijphart’s (1999) classification of countries according to the
strength of judicial review, which takes into account whether procedures
for judicial review of legislation exist, how actively the courts assert this
power, and how difficult it is to change the constitution. Germany has
the highest score (4), followed by Austria, Belgium, and France (3), Swe-
den, Norway, and Denmark (2), and finally the United Kingdom, Swit-
zerland, and the Netherlands (1). Two alternative measures of the in-
fluence of the judiciary, Alivizatos’s (1995) measure of “judicial
politicization,” and Kneip’s (2008) measure of the strength of constitu-
tional courts are strongly correlated with Lijphart’s and lead to very
similar results.
Left-Wing Government Incumbency
Left-wing government incumbency is measured by the fraction of months
in the period leading up to the measurement year of the dependent var-
iable during which left-wing parties were in government; for example,
immigrant rights in 2002 are predicted on the basis of left-wing incum-
bency during 1990–2001. Months with governments in which left and
right parties held each other in the balance, or in which left parties were
a minority partner, were weighted half, as were periods of “cohabitation”
6 For the comparison of political rights scores with the MIPEX data, we exclude our
indicator on Muslim consultative bodies, because consultation of religious organizations
is not included in MIPEX.
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TABLE 2
Pearson Correlations between Our Indicators of Citizenship Rights for
Immigrants (ICRI) and Scores Assigned by Four Other Indicator-Based Studies
Naturalization:
LOI 1997 (reversed)—ICRI 2002 (n p 8) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .90**
MIPEX 2006—ICRI 2008 (n p 10) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .76*
CPI 1980s, 2008—ICRI 1990, 2008 (n p 16) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .74***
BNI 1980, 1990, 2002 (reversed)—ICRI 1980, 1990, 2002 (n p 30) . . . . . . .74***
Marriage migration rights:
LOI 1997—ICRI 2002 (n p 8) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69
MIPEX 2006—ICRI 2008 (n p 10) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .74*
Protection against expulsion:
LOI 1997—ICRI 2002 (n p 8) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75*
MIPEX 2006—ICRI 2008 (n p 10) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .82**
Antidiscrimination provisions:
MIPEX 2006—ICRI 2008 (n p 10) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79**
Political rights:
MIPEX 2006—ICRI 2008 (n p 10) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .94***
Cultural rights dimension:
MPI 1980, 2000, 2010—ICRI 1980, 2002, 2008 (n p 30) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .81***
 P ! .10.
* P ! .05.
** P ! .01.
*** P ! .001.
in France between a president and a government of different political
colors. As left-wing parties, we counted social democratic, socialist, com-
munist, green, and left-liberal parties. On average across the 10 countries,
left-wing parties were more strongly represented in government in the
period 1990–2001 (an average score of .60 on the scale from 0 to 1) than
in the periods 1980–89 (.39) and 2002–8 (.42). Table 3 shows how left-
wing government incumbency varied across countries. Left-wing parties
had the weakest representation in government in Denmark (.32) and the
strongest in Sweden (.70).
Electoral Strength of Right-Wing Populist Parties
Electoral strength of right-wing populist parties is measured by the av-
erage between the worst and the best result of these parties in national
parliamentary elections during the period leading up to the measurement
year of the dependent variable.7 Across the 10 countries, the electoral
7 The following parties were considered as right-wing populist: Austria: FPO¨ (since
1986), BZO¨; Belgium: VB, FN; Denmark: Z, DF; Germany: NPD, Rep, DVU; Neth-
erlands: CP, CD, CP’86, LPF, PVV; Norway: FP; Sweden: NyD, SD; Switzerland:
SVP, NA (until 1987), Republikaner, Lega, SD; United Kingdom: BNP, ND. Analyses
excluding the Danish Z, the Norwegian FP, and the Swiss SVP, which some may argue
are more mainstream conservative than the other parties, do not fundamentally alter
the direction of the results but lead to lower regression coefficients.
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TABLE 3
Fraction of Years with Left-Wing Government Incumbency and Vote
Shares of Right-Wing Populist Parties across 10 Countries
Left-Wing
Government
Incumbency
(0–1)
Right-Wing
Populist
Vote Share
(%)
Austria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45 17.3
Belgium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39 7.9
Denmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32 9.3
France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .44 10.0
Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42 1.5
Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38 4.7
Norway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60 13.7
Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70 1.6
Switzerland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50 20.8
United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51 0.3
Average . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47 8.7
Note.—Averages for 1980–2008.
strength of right-wing populist parties has increased continuously, from
4.4% of the vote in 1980–89, via 9.5% in 1990–2001, to 12.1% in 2002–
8. As table 3 shows, cross-national differences were stark as well, with
the weakest populist right in the United Kingdom (0.3%) and the strongest
in Switzerland (20.8%).
Share of Voters of Immigrant Origin
There are no existing data on the share of immigrants and their second-
generation descendants among the electorate. We therefore calculated our
own measure, based on naturalization figures, jus soli acquisitions of
citizenship by the second generation, and data on postcolonial immigrants
who came with full citizenship rights to France, the United Kingdom,
and the Netherlands. We also took into account that in some countries
foreign citizens may have voting rights on the local level, and in the United
Kingdom also on the national level. Taking into account local voting rights
is relevant because some aspects of immigrant rights, especially those
related to cultural rights, depend on local regulations and implementation
and are therefore likely to be influenced by immigrant voting pressure
on that level of the polity. Table 4 shows the resulting immigrant-origin
voter shares. A detailed description of how we arrived at these estimates
can be accessed online.8
Across the 10 countries, the share of immigrant-origin voters increased
8 Available at http://www.wzb.eu/files/mit/immigrantvoters.doc.
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strongly over time, for the national level from an average of 1.5% in 1980
to 8.0% in 2008, and for the local level from 2.4% in 1980 to 12.0% in
2008. As table 4 shows, Germany had in 2008 the smallest immigrant-
origin electorate (5.7% of local and 2.8% of national voters) while im-
migrants and their direct descendants made up the largest share of the
local electorate in Sweden (17.5%) and the largest share of the national
electorate in Switzerland (11.9%). For our analyses, we took the average
of the local and national percentages of voters of immigrant origin. As in
the case of the other variables, we use the average value during the period
leading up to the measurement year of the dependent variable as a pre-
dictor variable, that is, the average of the current and previous value of
the share of immigrant-origin voters.
Economic Growth
Some theorists have argued that policies on immigration are driven by
economic considerations (e.g., Cornelius et al. 1994), and ethnic compe-
tition theories posit that economic downturns may spur anti-immigrant
sentiments (e.g., Olzak 1992). As a control variable, we therefore include
in our multivariate analyses the average annual level of per capita eco-
nomic growth (based on World Bank/Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development [OECD] national accounts) in the period
leading up to the measurement year of the dependent variable.
RESULTS
Descriptive Findings
We begin by investigating the merits of hypothesis 1 drawn from the
liberal convergence perspective, which states that immigrant citizenship
policies have become more inclusive over time. We first look at trends
across different types of immigrant rights. Further below (table 7) we
present evidence on trends across countries.
As table 5 shows, the evidence is strongly in line with the hypothesis.
For seven out of eight substantive policy fields, and for both theoretical
dimensions, rights for immigrants were more inclusive in 2008 than they
were in 1980. The strongest increase occurred for antidiscrimination leg-
islation, which was weak in most countries in 1980 (average score 0.21)
but had become quite strong by 2008 (0.60). Strong trends toward greater
inclusiveness can also be observed for access of nonnationals to public
sector employment, although even in 2008 the 10-country average was
still slightly on the exclusive side (0.06). A very similar pattern is dis-
cernable for political rights (from0.43 in 1980 to0.08 in 2008). Cultural
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TABLE 5
Average Scores for Different Types of Immigrant Citizenship Rights
across 10 Countries, 1980–2008
1980 1990 2002 2008
Naturalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .02 .02 .20 .05
Marriage migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71 .73 .45 .14
Expulsion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28 .19 .10 .08
Public sector employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60 .43 .09 .06
Antidiscrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 .11 .33 .60
Political rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43 .29 .20 .08
Cultural rights in education . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38 .17 .17 .14
Other cultural and religious rights . . . . . .29 .22 .07 .01
Individual equality dimension . . . . . . . . . . .09 .01 .15 .13
Cultural difference dimension . . . . . . . . . . . .30 .19 .04 .03
Note.—Higher scores indicate more inclusive policies.
rights in education have also expanded. In 1980, most countries still of-
fered few rights in this domain (0.38), but by 2008 a shift to the inclusive
side of the spectrum had occurred (0.14). Weaker trends toward greater
inclusion occurred regarding naturalization, expulsion, and cultural and
religious rights outside the educational system. However, with the excep-
tion of antidiscrimination and political rights, the trend toward more
inclusive rights stagnates after 2002. Naturalization rights even became
considerably more restrictive between 2002 and 2008, especially in the
form of stricter language requirements and citizenship tests (Joppke 2007;
Michalowski 2009; Odmalm 2007). Considering the two theoretical di-
mensions of individual and cultural rights, we find a similar pattern of
liberalization until 2002, and a reversal to somewhat more restrictive
policies thereafter.
The only rights with a trend toward greater restrictiveness across the
whole period are those related to marriage migration, which were very
inclusive in most countries in 1980 (0.71) but were after 1990 progres-
sively tightened (0.14 in 2008). The reason for this deviation from the
other policy fields may be that marriage migration rights affect not only
those who are already resident, but also those who want to enter as new
immigrants. Since the end of guest-worker recruitment around 1975, fam-
ily migration has become the most important channel for immigration to
Europe (Kofman 2004; OECD 2008). Faced with this chain migration
pressure, many European governments have sought to restrict marriage
migration by raising age, housing, and income criteria, and more recently
in some countries by demanding host-country language knowledge from
the migrating spouse (Groenendijk 2006; van Oers, Ersbøll, and Kostak-
opoulou 2010).
We proceed with hypothesis 2, also drawn from the convergence per-
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spective, which predicts that cross-national differences decline over time.
As a measure of the degree of similarity across countries, we computed
the standard deviations in each measurement year for the eight substan-
tive categories of immigrant rights, and for the two theoretical dimen-
sions.9
If the convergence hypothesis is correct, countries’ positions should
move progressively closer together in the policy space over time. As table
6 shows, antidiscrimination legislation exemplifies this pattern with a
standard deviation that steadily declines from 0.53 in 1980 to 0.37 in 2002.
The strongest convergence occurs toward the years 2002 and 2008, co-
inciding with the introduction of two directives of the European Council
in 2000,10 which mandated EU member states to introduce antidiscrim-
ination legislation. Thus, antidiscrimination legislation provides a perfect
case in point for the convergence perspective generally, and for its post-
national variant in particular.
In two other fields, naturalization and protection against expulsion, we
also find convergence from 1980 to 2002, but renewed divergence after
2002. In the case of expulsion, the net result is still a modest decrease in
the standard deviation across the period as a whole (from 0.57 in 1980
to 0.47 in 2008). However, against the two cases in which we find full
(antidiscrimination) or partial (expulsion) evidence for convergence, there
are six fields of immigrant rights in which we find either stable cross-
country differences or evidence for divergence. In the case of naturali-
zation, the net result of convergence until 2002 and divergence thereafter
is that cross-country differences have remained of exactly the same mag-
nitude (standard deviations of 0.54 in both 1980 and 2008). Cross-country
differences regarding political rights were also stable over time (standard
deviations of 0.35 in 1980 and 0.37 in 2008). The remaining four policy
fields show strong divergence, most strongly so in the case of marriage
migration rights, which were relatively similar in 1980 (standard deviation
0.26) but had come to diverge strongly by 2008 (standard deviation 0.58).
Contradicting the postnationalist perspective, this divergence has oc-
curred in spite of the European Directive of 2003 on the right to family
reunification.11 Similar but less outspoken divergence patterns can be ob-
9 Plu¨mper and Schneider (2009, p. 299) conclude that the standard deviation is a more
accurate measure to detect convergence than the coefficient of variation.
10 Council Directive 2000/43/EC prohibits discrimination against anyone because of
their racial or ethnic origin. Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishes a general frame-
work for equal treatment in employment and occupation.
11 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of September 22, 2003, on the right to family reuni-
fication.
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TABLE 6
Standard Deviations for Different Types of Immigrant Citizenship Rights
across 10 Countries, 1980–2008
1980 1990 2002 2008
Naturalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54 .50 .43 .54
Marriage migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26 .21 .55 .58
Expulsion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57 .54 .41 .47
Public sector employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .44 .55 .61 .59
Antidiscrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53 .50 .42 .37
Political rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35 .38 .35 .37
Cultural rights in education . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 .41 .46 .48
Other cultural and religious rights . . . . . .26 .33 .33 .35
Individual equality dimension . . . . . . . . . . .43 .42 .34 .37
Cultural difference dimension . . . . . . . . . . . .20 .29 .30 .31
served for public sector employment, cultural rights in education, and
other cultural and religious rights.
If we turn to the two theoretical dimensions of citizenship rights, we
also observe a mixed pattern. Individual equality rights converged until
2002, but again diverged between 2002 and 2008. Regarding cultural
difference rights, policies were quite similar in 1980 with a standard de-
viation of 0.20, but began to diverge over the 1980s, reaching a standard
deviation of 0.29 by 1990. Since then, policy differences have remained
more or less stable. Taken together, these results lead us to reject the
convergence hypothesis 2, as overall we observe a mixed pattern of con-
vergence, divergence, and stability of cross-national differences, in which,
moreover, divergence is more frequent than convergence.
Hypothesis 3, drawn from theories of national path dependence, pre-
dicts that cross-national differences are resilient because countries move
along specific trajectories circumscribed to an important extent by their
historical positions. To investigate the merits of this hypothesis, table 7
shows the average positions and rank orders of the 10 countries across
all 41 indicators of immigrant rights across the period 1980–2008. Coun-
tries are listed in descending order of inclusiveness, based on the scores
for 2008.
With the single exception of Denmark, all countries had more inclusive
immigrant rights policies in 2008 than in 1980, confirming the general
liberalization trend predicted by hypothesis 1. However, table 7 also con-
firms that this trend was partly reversed after 2002, when 5 of the 10
countries saw restrictions in immigrant rights. Hypothesis 3 predicts that
in spite of such changes, the relative positioning of countries will not
undergo radical changes. In 2008, we observe three groups of countries:
Sweden, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Belgium, with high
degrees of inclusiveness (between .51 and .34); Austria and Switzerland,
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TABLE 7
Average Scores and Rankings of Countries on Immigrant Citizenship Rights,
1980–2008
1980 1990 2002 2008
Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 (1) .31 (2) .48 (1) .51 (1)
United Kingdom . . . .18 (2) .22 (3) .43 (3) .44 (2)
Netherlands . . . . . . . . .17 (5) .33 (1) .47 (2) .40 (3)
Belgium . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 (7) .13 (6) .19 (5) .34 (4)
Norway . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 (4) .06 (5) .21 (4) .12 (5)
Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . .54 (9) .49 (9) .11 (7) .12 (6)
France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18 (6) .14 (7) .16 (8) .15 (7)
Denmark . . . . . . . . . . . .09 (3) .02 (4) .10 (6) .17 (8)
Switzerland . . . . . . . . . .60 (10) .57 (10) .31 (10) .30 (9)
Austria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47 (8) .42 (8) .18 (9) .30 (10)
Average . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 .10 .09 .08
Note.—Higher scores indicate more inclusive policies. Countries are listed in the order
of their degree of inclusiveness in 2008. Figures in parentheses indicate rank orders.
with strongly restrictive policies (both.30); and Norway, Germany, Den-
mark, and France clustered in the middle with mildly inclusive to mildly
restrictive policies (between .12 and .17). If we compare this to the
situation in 1980, we again find three groups, and 7 of the 10 countries
are in the same group as in 2008: Sweden and the United Kingdom were
already comparatively inclusive in 1980 (.27 and .18), Switzerland and
Austria were already among the most restrictive countries (.60 and
.47), and Denmark Norway, and France were situated in the middle of
the spectrum (.09 to .18). The Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany
followed a trajectory of comparatively strong liberalization, and as a result
switched from the middle to the top group (the Netherlands and Belgium)
or from the bottom to the middle group (Germany). In view of the im-
portance that it has gained as a paradigm case of ethnocultural exclu-
siveness, the change in the relative position of Germany is perhaps the
most striking. While in 1980 France and Germany were still far apart,
by 2008 they were situated very close together, thus falsifying Brubaker’s
earlier cited prediction that France and Germany would continue to define
their citizenries in fundamentally different ways (1992, p. 186).
While the evidence thus contradicts a more rigid version of the path-
dependence argument, overall the evidence is largely in line with hy-
pothesis 3, as evidenced by the strong correlation between the rankings
of countries in 1980 and 2008 (Spearman’s r p .69, P ! .05). Of course,
the stability of countries’ relative positioning varies across types of im-
migrant rights. Generally, country differences are somewhat more stable
on the cultural rights dimension than on the individual equality dimen-
sion. For six of the substantive policy fields, we find moderate to strong
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temporal continuity, with r’s ranging from .55 for access to naturalization
(P ! .10) to .84 for political rights, P ! .01). In two policy fields, marriage
migration and rights in the educational domain, we find no significant
continuity in countries’ relative positions. However, in both cases, the
reason for the weaker temporal correlations is divergence, not convergence
(see table 5).
Summing up, the descriptive evidence is only partly conclusive. The
convergence hypothesis 2 must clearly be rejected because policy con-
vergence was the exception rather than the rule. We did find evidence in
favor of the other two hypotheses. Policies in 9 of the 10 countries and
in all but one of the categories of rights were, in line with hypothesis 1,
more liberal in 2008 than in 1980. However, the trend was not linear, as
5 of 10 countries and 7 of the 10 categories of rights showed partial
reversals to more restrictive policies between 2002 and 2008. Evidence
for hypothesis 3 about the stability of cross-national differences was also
generally supportive with moderate to strong correlations between coun-
tries’ relative positions in 1980 and 2008. However, some changes, most
notably those in Germany, strongly deviated from historical patterns.
Given this mixed pattern of support for some of the predictions of both
the liberal convergence and national political process perspectives, we
sustain the verdict for the time being and turn to the causal predictions
that the two perspectives make.
Explanatory Findings
According to the liberal convergence perspective, we should expect in-
clusive policies of immigrant rights to be associated with EU membership
(hypothesis 4) and strong judicial review (hypothesis 5). National political
process theories predict inclusive immigrant rights to be associated with
left-wing government incumbency (hypothesis 6), a weak populist right
(hypothesis 7), and a large share of voters of immigrant origin (hypothesis
8). To investigate the merits of these five hypotheses, we conducted mul-
tivariate analyses in which we take levels of immigrant rights as the
dependent variable, and use prior levels of the five variables that are
suggested by hypotheses 4–8 as predictors. Because we take the initial
differences that existed between countries in 1980 as a given that we do
not seek to explain in this article, we additionally include the 1980 level
of the dependent variable as a predictor. Thus, we investigate to what
extent the five proposed mechanisms can explain to what extent and in
which direction countries have moved away from the positions they oc-
cupied in 1980. In addition, the predictive power of the 1980 level indicates
the degree of policy continuity and therefore serves as a further test of
hypothesis 3 on national path dependence. Average economic growth lev-
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els are added as a control variable. Because the independent variables
are lagged one period, we retain 30 cases for analysis. To avoid that, with
this low number of cases, the simultaneous inclusion of all seven predictor
variables leads to spurious results, we use stepwise regression and include
only those variables that attain at least a significance level of P ! .10.12
Table 8 shows the results of these analyses for all 41 indicators of
immigrant rights taken together, as well as separately for the two theo-
retical dimensions of individual equality and cultural difference rights.
The results are very similar across the three regressions. The first im-
portant result is a negative one: we find no significant effects for the two
mechanisms that are proposed by the liberal convergence perspective, EU
membership and strong courts, and hypotheses 4 and 5 therefore have to
be rejected. The lack of a relationship with EU membership can be il-
lustrated by the descriptive findings in table 7 above. Although two EU
countries that originally had rather exclusive citizenship policies, Germany
and Belgium, show strong trends toward greater inclusiveness, the only
country that reveals a net decline in inclusiveness over the period 1980–
2008, Denmark, is also an EU member. For Austria and Sweden, which
became EU members in 1995, we do not observe any impact of their
accession to the EU. Between 1990 and 2002, Austria’s score increased
by 0.24 and Sweden’s by 0.17, which is even a bit less than the increases
in the two countries that did not join the EU during this period (Norway
and Switzerland, 0.25 and 0.26).
Table 7 also illustrates the lack of association between levels of im-
migrant rights and the importance of the courts in the policy process.
According to hypothesis 5, we should find either more inclusive levels of
citizenship rights in countries with strong judicial review or a stronger
trend toward liberalization, or both. The findings show that none of these
is the case. Countries with medium to strong judicial review actually
have, with the exception of Belgium, below-average levels of immigrant
citizenship rights in 2008, while the three countries with the most inclusive
citizenship policies—Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the Nether-
lands—are classified by Lijphart as having weak or no judicial review.
Nor is there any relationship between trends in immigrant rights and the
strength of judicial review: the countries with the greatest expansion in
rights—Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany—range from the bottom
to the top of Lijphart’s classification of judicial influence.
The results of the multivariate analyses are much more in line with
the national political process perspective. To begin with, we find strong
evidence of path dependence in the form of a powerful effect of the level
12 We performed all stepwise regressions both forward and backward but obtained
exactly identical results.
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TABLE 8
Results of Stepwise Regressions of Levels of Immigrant Rights, 1990–2008
All
Immigrant
Rights
Individual
Equality
Rights
Cultural
Difference
Rights
EU membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NS NS NS
Strength of judicial review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NS NS NS
1980 level of rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .596 (.000) .558 (.000) .786 (.002)
Share of immigrant-origin voters . . . . . . . . . .042 (.001) .039 (.002) .042 (.002)
Vote share of right-wing populist parties . . . .011 (.029) .011 (.058) .011 (.034)
Left-party government incumbency . . . . . . NS NS NS
Economic growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NS NS NS
Constant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .004 (.961) .002 (.977) .056 (.615)
Adjusted R2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .74 .75 .66
N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 30 30
Note.— Unstandardized regression coefficients and significance levels; NS p not sig-
nificant.
of rights in 1980 on subsequent levels, confirming what table 7 already
showed descriptively. More importantly, we find support for two of the
three mechanisms proposed by this perspective. As predicted by hypoth-
esis 8, a high share of voters of immigrant origin leads to higher subsequent
levels of immigrant rights. Taking the regression for all immigrant rights
as an example, a one standard deviation increase in the share of immi-
grant-origin voters (3.4%) leads to a 0.14 increase on the scale of
immigrant rights. In line with hypothesis 7 and with Howard’s (2009)
findings regarding naturalization policies, we find that a high vote share
of right-wing populist parties reduces subsequent levels of immigrant
rights. A one standard deviation increase in the vote share of the populist
right (8.0%) leads to a .09 reduction in the level of immigrant rights.
The only hypothesis drawn from the national political process perspective
that must be rejected is hypothesis 6 about the effects of left-wing parties
in government. Government incumbency of the right or left is not sys-
tematically associated with lower or higher levels of immigrant rights.
This result concurs with Freeman’s (2006) argument that both mainstream
left and right parties tend to be split over immigration issues, and with
Howard’s (2009) empirical findings regarding policies on immigrants’ ac-
cess to nationality. Janoski (2010, pp. 236–37) finds a positive effect of
left and green party power on naturalization rates when controlling for
naturalization policies. This implies that left-wing party power affects the
implementation of policies rather than the policies themselves and there-
fore does not necessarily contradict our results.
The economic growth control variable did not attain significance in
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any of the models.13 This is in line with Howard’s (2009) finding on the
determinants of liberalization of nationality legislation, but contradicts
Janoski (2010, p. 236), who found a positive impact of economic growth
on naturalization rates. However, the latter result is difficult to compare
with ours for two reasons. First, naturalization rates are different from
naturalization policies and, importantly, depend not only on the motives
of the state and political actors but also on the willingness and ability of
immigrants to naturalize, which may depend on economic prospects in
the country of residence, particularly in countries where sufficient income
or absence of welfare dependence are conditions for naturalization. Sec-
ond, the effect Janoski finds on rates controls for naturalization policies;
that is, it indicates that economic growth led to higher naturalization rates
given certain naturalization policies.
We additionally explored whether there were any significant interac-
tions of the state of the economy with the political variables, for example,
whether immigrant voters and left-wing governments had more and right-
wing parties less impact on immigrant rights in times of high economic
growth. We found no such effects. These negative results may be due to
the fact that we focus here on the rights of permanently resident immi-
grants and not on the entry rights of new immigrants, which might be
more strongly influenced by economic considerations of ethnic competition
and labor market shortages. Against this interpretation, however, we did
not find an effect of economic growth on marriage migration rights, which
do have an entry rights component.
Closer inspection of the relationships between the significant indepen-
dent variables shows that path dependence and the mechanisms of im-
migrant voter power and populist party strength are to an important
extent interrelated. Taking the first regression in table 8 as an example,
the 1980 score on immigrant rights alone accounts for 82% of the variance
explained by the full three-variable model. However, if we exclude the
1980 score from the regression, the coefficients for the immigrant voter
share and especially for populist party strength become much stronger
and together account for a similar share of the variance explained by the
full model (81%). The reason for these overlaps in explanatory power is
that countries’ initial policies on immigrant rights in 1980—which one
may see as still strongly reflecting Brubaker’s historical conceptions of
nationhood—are significantly correlated with the likelihood that these
13 The effect of economic growth might be indirect via the political variables, e.g.,
because economic downturns stimulate the rise of right-wing parties. We investigated
whether this was the case by entering economic growth into our models before the
political variables, but found no significant effect of economic growth in that case
either.
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countries will subsequently develop sizable immigrant electorates or
strong right-wing populist parties.
This is most strongly the case for the strength of right-wing populism,
which is strongly negatively correlated (rp .50, P ! .01) with the 1980
score on immigrant rights, indicating that countries that had restrictive
policies in 1980 were more likely to also be the countries where right-
wing populist parties would subsequently be successful (see also Koop-
mans and Kriesi 1997). The strength of these parties, in turn, negatively
influenced extensions of immigrant rights and thus kept these countries
on restrictive paths. Conversely, countries that scored high on immigrant
rights in 1980 were more likely to also be countries in which immigrant-
origin voters made up a large share among the electorate in the following
decades, although this relationship is not very strong (r p .27, P ! .10).
High shares of immigrant voters exerted pressure to keep these countries
on inclusive paths.
Robustness Checks
The fact that there is a correlation, even if only a weak one, between the
share of immigrant voters and the inclusiveness of immigrant rights raises
a potential problem with the analysis presented in table 8. Six of our 41
indicators of immigrant rights, the five relating to naturalization policies
and the one relating to voting rights for foreign residents, will directly
affect the size of the immigrant electorate, and therefore the effect of the
immigrant voter share on immigrant rights that we observed in table 8
may be partly due to the reverse causal process. To investigate whether
this is the case, we repeated the three regressions in table 8 but excluded
the naturalization and voting rights indicators from the dependent var-
iables. The results (not shown in the table) reveal that the effects of the
immigrant voter share remain significant and of a similar magnitude. We
can therefore conclude that the effects we found in table 8 are not the
result of reverse causality. What does change in the additional regressions
is that the strength of the populist right becomes insignificant in the
regressions with all immigrant rights and with individual equality rights
as the dependent variables. This suggests that a strong populist right
especially affects naturalization and cultural difference rights.
As a further test of the robustness of our results, we explore a second
potential problem with the regressions in table 8. As we have seen in
tables 5 and 7, there is in most policy areas and in most countries a
temporal trend toward liberalization. Because the immigrant voter share
also increases strongly over time, it may be that this variable just picks
up a trend effect caused by some other process. To investigate this pos-
sibility, we repeated the stepwise regressions shown in table 8, but ad-
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ditionally included a trend variable in the analyses, which simply counted
the number of years since 1980. In the regressions for all immigrant rights
and for individual equality rights, the trend variable did not attain sig-
nificance, and the results therefore remain unchanged. In the regression
of cultural difference rights, the trend variable was significant and the
immigrant voter share did not enter the equation. From this we conclude
that the immigrant voter share has especially had a liberalizing effect on
individual equality rights. It may also have exerted such an influence on
cultural difference rights, but here we cannot exclude the possibility that
some unobserved trended process is responsible for the effect observed in
table 8. When the trend variable is included in the regression of cultural
difference rights, the effect of the populist right remains and becomes
even a bit stronger.
As a final robustness check, we undertook a sensitivity analysis for the
regression of all immigrant rights, in which we subsequently removed one
country at a time from the analysis. The immigrant voter share remains
significant in all 10 regressions. Right-wing populist party strength re-
mains significant in 9 of the 10 regressions, but falls below significance—
though it still has the correct negative direction—in the regression in
which the Netherlands is excluded. The Netherlands is the country that
has seen the most abrupt change in the strength of the populist right.
Until 2001, it had a very weak populist right, on a similar level as Sweden
and Germany. However, in the elections of 2002, the new party of Pim
Fortuyn, who was murdered a week before the election, achieved a major
breakthrough, capturing 17% of the vote. Later, Geert Wilders’ Freedom
Party picked up Fortuyn’s electorate and achieved similar results. As table
7 above has shown, the Netherlands is also one of the countries in which
the restrictive turn in immigrant rights policies has been most pronounced.
The association between restrictions in immigrant rights and populist
party strength thus seems to be especially driven by the Dutch case.14
14 We also conducted stepwise regressions taking the eight substantive areas of im-
migrant rights as dependent variables, using the same independent variables as were
used in the analyses for table 8. In all regressions, the 1980 level was a significant and
strong predictor of subsequent levels, indicating that country differences were relatively
stable in all eight policy areas. Further, for naturalization rights and for other cultural
rights, the results were exactly the same as those in table 8, with significant effects for
both the immigrant voter share and the strength of the populist right, and no significant
effects for the other variables. We find no significant effects of populist party strength
on the other six policy areas. The share of immigrant voters also exerted a significant
liberalizing effect on expulsion and antidiscrimination policies, but no significant im-
pact on policies in the other areas. The other variables hardly played a role. Left-wing
government incumbency did not attain significance in any of the regressions. EU
membership was marginally significant (P ! .10) and positive in the regression of
public service access. This may indicate that the opening of public service jobs to
This content downloaded from 130.37.129.78 on Wed, 30 Oct 2013 10:36:22 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Citizenship Rights for Immigrants
1233
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We have investigated the merits of theories of cross-national convergence
and national political processes in accounting for the evolution of im-
migrant citizenship rights in 10 European countries since 1980. On the
descriptive level, we found evidence of liberalization in most policy areas,
with the stark exception of marriage migration rights, and in most coun-
tries, with the exception of Denmark and France. However, in the period
since 2002, this liberalization trend was partly reversed, and 5 of the 10
countries moved toward more restrictive policies. That countries partly
moved in similar directions does not imply that they also moved closer
together as implied by convergence theories. We found evidence of policy
convergence in only two of the eight areas of immigrant rights that we
analyzed (antidiscrimination and protection against expulsion), but strong
divergence in four areas (access to public service employment, cultural
rights in education, other cultural and religious rights, and marriage mi-
gration rights). Overall, therefore, cross-national differences in immigrant
rights became larger rather than smaller over the period 1980–2008.
In addition, we found no support for the two causal mechanisms that
the liberal convergence perspective offers to explain cross-national dif-
ferences in the evolution of immigrant rights. Levels and trends of im-
migrant rights did not differ systematically between EU member coun-
tries, non-EU members, and countries that became EU members. In fact,
the only country that became significantly more restrictive over time,
Denmark, is a long-standing EU member. The EU directives on antidis-
crimination legislation are often cited as evidence for a liberalizing impact
of the EU on immigrant rights policies, and indeed we find policy con-
vergence in this area, which, however, includes the two non-EU countries
in our sample, Switzerland and Norway. Moreover, if one counts this as
supportive evidence for EU-led liberal convergence, one also has to deal
with the fact that in two other areas within the EU’s scope of action,
public service employment and marriage migration rights, we find policy
divergence, not convergence.
Nor did we find evidence that pointed toward strong courts as a driving
force behind liberalization. Countries with strong traditions of judicial
review did not differ systematically from countries with weak or no ju-
dicial review. Against examples of liberalizing court rulings, one can point
at counterexamples where courts upheld restrictive policies or blocked
citizens of other EU member states has had a weak spin-off effect on rights of non-
EU citizens. The strength of judicial review was also significant once (and highly so,
P ! .001), again in the regression of public service access. However, the sign of this
effect was negative and thus ran counter to the idea that strong courts are a source
of liberalization.
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liberalizations, for instance, when in 1990 the German Federal Consti-
tutional Court aborted the initiative of three states to introduce voting
rights for foreigners. Our results suggest that the truth lies in the middle:
insofar as domestic courts have affected immigrant rights, they have on
average had neither a liberalizing nor a restrictive effect.
By contrast, the results strongly underline the role of electoral factors
in explaining changes in immigrant rights. We found support for two of
the three causal mechanisms proposed by the national political process
perspective. They help us understand why some countries have liberalized
immigrant rights more than others, and why recently many of them have
moved again toward more restrictive policies. Our analyses point toward
the growth of the electorate of immigrant origin as an important driving
force behind expansions of rights. By 2008, immigrants and their second-
generation descendants made up between 3% and 12% of the national
electorate of our countries of study, and between 6% and 18% of the local
electorate. Even in countries with restrictive naturalization and no voting
rights for aliens, immigrants can over time become a sizable part of the
electorate as long as their numbers are large enough, for example, in the
case of Switzerland. This makes the liberalization of immigrant rights to
some extent a self-reinforcing process. As more immigrants obtain voting
rights, political parties will become more inclined to cater to their interests,
which may entail liberalizations of naturalization and voting rights that
increase the size of the immigrant-origin electorate further.
However, these electoral pressures in favor of liberalization can be
countered by successful right-wing populist parties, who mobilize native
voters opposed to extensions of immigrant rights. Our analyses demon-
strated that such populist parties have especially been successful in pro-
voking restrictions in the areas of naturalization and cultural rights. Their
increased success during the 1990s, and even more so in the wake of
September 11, 2001, has contributed importantly to the restrictive turn
in immigrant rights policies that we observe in many countries, most
outspokenly in the Netherlands, where there has been a dramatic rupture
in the success of the populist right in the first decade of this century. We
found no evidence, however, that mainstream left or right government
incumbency matters. Apparently, the lure of immigrant voters and com-
petition from the populist right affect mainstream left and right govern-
ments in similar ways.
Combining the two central electoral politics mechanisms, we can dis-
tinguish four configurations. Sweden, the United Kingdom, and, until
2002, the Netherlands exemplify the first configuration, characterized by
very weak populist right parties and a large share of voters of immigrant
origin. This provides the optimal scenario for liberalization, in which
mainstream parties have much to win and little to lose by extending
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immigrant rights. In the Netherlands, this situation has dramatically
changed since the political murders of two vocal critics of multiculturalism
and Islam, the politician Pim Fortuyn in 2002 and filmmaker Theo van
Gogh in 2004. The ensuing breakthrough of right-wing populist parties
explains why the Netherlands has played a leading role in the restrictive
turn in immigrant rights policies in the last decade. Absent such a break-
through of the populist right, Sweden and the United Kingdom have
continued on more inclusive paths. The electoral success of Sweden’s
populist right in the 2010 elections may, however, signal a reversal also
in Sweden.
Diametrically opposed to this configuration we find Austria, Denmark,
and Norway, which are characterized by strong right-wing populist parties
and relatively small immigrant electorates. This is the scenario that is
least likely to lead to liberalization of immigrant rights because for main-
stream parties there is little to win and much to lose when they embark
on such policies. All three countries showed below-average liberalization,
Austria had become by 2008 the most restrictive country, and Denmark
was the only country that saw net restrictions in immigrant rights over
the entire period 1980–2008. The reasons why these countries have small
immigrant electorates differ. In Austria, it results from restrictive natu-
ralization and voting rights policies in spite of a large immigrant popu-
lation. Denmark and Norway, however, initially had comparatively liberal
naturalization and voting rights policies, but still have a small immigrant-
origin electorate because their immigrant populations are relatively small.
The four remaining countries had more ambiguous configurations of
electoral opportunities. Germany combined a very low immigrant voter
share—the result of restrictive naturalization and voting rights policies
rather than of a small immigrant population—with a very weak populist
right. As a result of the absence of strong right-populist electoral pressure,
Germany has seen a comparatively strong liberalization of immigrant
rights. Switzerland has the opposite pattern, with the strongest populist
right among the 10 countries, but also a high immigrant voter share. As
in the case of Germany, this ambiguous configuration has resulted in more
liberalization than in countries such as Denmark and Austria, but because
in 1980 Switzerland had by far the most restrictive policies among the
10 countries, it was in 2008 still, together with Austria, one of the two
most restrictive countries.
France and Belgium, finally, have scores around the average on both
populist party strength and immigrant voter shares. In the case of France,
this is associated with a high degree of stability regarding immigrant
rights; in Belgium, with strong liberalization. While the French pattern
of stability reflects the countervailing voter pressures of populists and
immigrants, Belgium’s strong liberalization defies our explanatory model.
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This is particularly true for the Flemish part of the country in which the
vote share of the populist right is much higher than in the French-speaking
part of the country, and has been so already since the 1980s. In spite of
this strong competition from the right, Belgium’s mainstream parties have
maintained a strict “cordon sanitaire” of noncooperation with the populist
right and have responded with liberalization rather than with restrictive
policies to this challenge. Why such a strategy was chosen and maintained
in Belgium is an interesting question for further case-oriented research.
The intricacies of coalition building across the two language communities,
and the fact that the Flemish populist right has not only an anti-immigrant
but also a secessionist agenda may explain why Belgian mainstream par-
ties have not given in to pressure from the populist right.
While these electoral factors are important to understand changes over
time, we found that there was also a great deal of continuity in countries’
policies on immigrant rights. In fact, the 1980 level of rights in a country
was the single best predictor of where a country stood at later points in
time, indicating a high level of institutional inertia. As a result, the rank
order from more inclusive to more restrictive countries was remarkably
stable over time. Moreover, we found strong evidence that changes over
time were path dependent in the sense that the relative power of the
electoral mechanisms of right-wing populist party strength and the im-
migrant voter share were not randomly distributed across the countries,
but were correlated with countries’ initial policy positions in 1980.
Countries that had restrictive policies in 1980 were more likely to also
be the countries where right-wing populist parties were subsequently suc-
cessful. The strength of these parties, in turn, negatively influenced ex-
tensions of immigrant rights and thus kept these countries on restrictive
paths. Switzerland and Austria are good examples of this pattern. They
were, respectively, the first- and third-most restrictive countries in 1980
and were also the two countries where right-wing populist parties were
subsequently most successful (average vote shares across the 1980–2008
period of 20.8% and 17.3%, respectively; see table 3). We find the opposite
pattern for the United Kingdom and Sweden, the two most inclusive
countries in 1980, which also had, respectively, the weakest (0.3%) and
the third weakest (1.6%) populist right in subsequent decades.
The one deviation from this pattern is Germany, but it is the proverbial
exception that proves the rule. In 1980, Germany had the second-most
restrictive policies after Switzerland, but by 2008 it had overtaken not
only Austria, but also Denmark and, most significantly if we consider
Brubaker’s prediction that this was extremely unlikely to happen, even
France. Germany is, however, also the only among the originally strongly
restrictive countries in which right-wing populist parties have not gained
a foothold. Across the period 1980–2008, they commanded on average
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only 1.5% of the vote. The reason lies in the strong taboo that prevails
in German politics regarding anything that can be associated with the
Nazi past. This has led to the banning of several right-wing political
formations and the brandishing of others as “enemies of the constitution”
under surveillance of the internal security agencies (Minkenberg 2006).
Although right-wing populist parties have had occasional successes on
the regional level, the illegitimacy that surrounds them has thus far pre-
vented a populist right-wing party from gaining seats in the national
parliament. Germany does defy Brubaker’s prediction, but it does so as
a result of the rupture caused by its role in the Second World War and
the Holocaust, and the legitimacy problems that this poses to right-wing
populist parties.
Conversely, countries that scored high on immigrant rights in 1980 were
more likely to also be countries in which immigrant-origin voters made
up a large share among the electorate in the following decades, thus
creating a self-reinforcing process of rights extension. Sweden, which had
the highest score on immigrant rights in 1980 as well as high shares of
immigrant voters, exemplifies this pattern best. To a lesser extent, it also
fits the United Kingdom, which had the second-highest score on immi-
grant rights in 1980 and an above-average share of immigrant voters. On
the other side, Germany and Austria exemplify the pattern that countries
that were originally restrictive on immigrant rights tend to have lower
shares of immigrant voters. In Austria, this strengthens the restrictive
tendencies resulting from strong right-wing populist parties, which ex-
plains why Austria dropped from the eighth to the tenth place in the
country ranking of immigrant rights. In Germany, the lack of immigrant
voter pressure is counterbalanced by an equally weak populist right, re-
sulting in stronger liberalization tendencies.
There are two major deviations from the pattern that initially restrictive
countries will have low and initially inclusive countries high immigrant
voter shares, but again these exceptions are instructive. Immigrant voter
shares are only loosely linked to policies because they are strongly affected
by the number of immigrants. Switzerland is the first case in point: it has
comparatively restrictive naturalization policies and no voting rights for
foreigners, but because the immigrant population is so large (across 1980–
2008, the foreign-born made up 21.5% of the Swiss population against
an average of 10.4% across all 10 countries), it still has a comparatively
high share of immigrant-origin voters. This has mitigated the negative
pressure on immigrant rights that results from Switzerland having the
strongest populist right, which helps us understand why Switzerland has
shown stronger liberalization tendencies than Austria. Denmark is the
second case in point. It had the third-most liberal immigrant rights policies
in 1980, but has the smallest foreign-born population of the 10 countries
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(5.5% on average for the period 1980–2008). As a result, it has, in spite
of initially comparatively liberal naturalization policies and local voting
rights for foreigners, the second-smallest share of voters of immigrant
origin after Germany (see table 4). In combination with an above-average
vote share for the populist right (9.3%; see table 3), this helps us under-
stand why Denmark has been the only country where there has been a
net decrease in the level of immigrant rights from 1980 to 2008.
Thus, we find that there is no contradiction between path dependence
and the role of electoral factors, because often electoral factors acted as
the mechanisms by which nationally specific trajectories were reproduced
over time. Initially restrictive countries tended to provide fertile grounds
for right-wing populist parties and had small immigrant voter popula-
tions, resulting in continued restrictiveness. Initially inclusive countries
tended to have weak populist parties and large immigrant voter popu-
lations, resulting in change along inclusive paths. Deviations from these
patterns occurred where historical ruptures delegitimized the radical right
(Germany), or where immigrant numbers were exceptionally low (Den-
mark) or high (Switzerland), thus disturbing the otherwise strong linkage
between the inclusiveness of policies and the size of the immigrant voter
bloc.
All in all, our results suggest that immigrant rights are still very much
a national affair, and there are no indications that this is fundamentally
changing. National policies on immigrant rights show strong continuities,
and the factors behind changes are also predominantly national. Further
research should investigate the generality of our findings by extending
the geographical scope beyond western Europe. Postnational theories in
particular would perhaps fare better when the scope of investigation is
broadened. Although our analysis included EU and non-EU countries,
one might argue that countries such as Norway and Switzerland, or Aus-
tria and Sweden before accession, are nonetheless strongly influenced by
the EU to which they are tied by intimate economic and social linkages
as well as bilateral treaties. Perhaps analyses with a broader geographical
scope would reveal evidence of European convergence in comparison with
immigration countries such as the United States, Canada, or Australia.
A further restriction of our study is that we have focused on the rights
of those who have already obtained legal residence in a country, rather
than the entry rights of (prospective) new immigrants, be they labor mi-
grants, asylum seekers, or undocumented migrants. Rights related to the
entry of immigrants may be affected by different mechanisms—for ex-
ample, by economic considerations related to labor market shortages—
than the rights of legal residents and may also reveal a different balance
between national and supranational, and between electoral and judicial
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forces. Here too, systematic longitudinal and cross-national comparisons
would offer a promising extension to existing case-oriented accounts.
APPENDIX
Estimation of the Electorate of Immigrant Origin
To estimate the share of the electorate of immigrant origin, data on the
foreign-born population (e.g., United Nations Population Division 2008;
Kesler and Bloemraad 2010) are not suited because they do not take into
account that many immigrants do not have voting rights. The share of
immigrants with voting rights varies strongly across countries and over
time due to differential naturalization rates and postcolonial migration.
Alternatively, one could subtract the foreign (i.e., noncitizen) population
(e.g., Migration Information Source 2010) from the foreign-born popu-
lation to obtain an estimate of the first-generation immigrant population
with voting rights. Although this measure has the advantage of simplicity,
it contains three important inaccuracies that distort cross-national com-
parison. First, it is biased by the fact that in countries with restrictive
nationality acquisition, a substantial part of those with foreign citizenship
are not foreign-born immigrants but belong to the second generation of
children of immigrants born in the country of immigration. Second, the
measure does not take into account that foreign citizens may have voting
rights. In the Scandinavian countries, foreign citizens have had voting
rights on the local level since the beginning of our period of study, and
the same has been true for the Netherlands since 1985. With the Maas-
tricht Treaty of 1992, citizens of EU countries residing in another member
state received local voting rights. In the United Kingdom, citizens of
Commonwealth countries and of the Republic of Ireland have voting
rights on all levels of the polity. Third, while in a strict sense one might
argue that all foreign-born are immigrants, some belong to the same ethnic
group as the majority population of the country of immigration. Especially
in the case of countries that lost territories through defeat in the Second
World War (Germany) or through decolonization (France, the United
Kingdom, the Netherlands), substantial numbers of foreign-born people
are coethnics of the majority population who arrived with full citizenship
rights and no claims to cultural difference. We prefer to exclude these
coethnic migrants from our measure because they are not likely to exert
the same kind of electoral pressure toward extending immigrant rights as
will immigrant voters who belong to different ethnic and religious groups
than the majority population. Coethnic migrants tend to be affiliated with
the political right, for example, the “Aussiedler” from eastern Europe in
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Germany or the “pieds noirs” from Algeria in France (Wu¨st 2003; Comtat
2009).
We therefore calculated a more complex measure that takes into account
these factors and also includes the second-generation offspring of immi-
grants. As a first step, we calculated for each of our measurement points
the cumulative number of persons naturalized since 1970 based on a
variety of data sources (Lederer 1997; Janoski 2010; Migration Infor-
mation Source 2010; OECD 2010). Using Janoski’s (2010) estimates, we
included jus soli acquisitions of nationality by the second generation in
France and the United Kingdom. We further adjusted these figures for
the three countries—France, the Netherlands,15 and the United King-
dom—where immigrants from former or remaining colonies held citizen-
ship upon arrival or, in the case of the United Kingdom, have national-
level voting rights even if they do not have the British nationality. For
the Netherlands, we used data provided by Nicolaas and Sprangers (2007)
and added for each measurement year the numbers of persons who were
either born in Surinam and the Dutch Antilles or had at least one parent
born there. We did not add all persons born in Indonesia because a sub-
stantial part of these immigrants were ethnic Dutch, who returned to the
Netherlands after Indonesian independence. However, another part of the
Indonesian foreign-born consists of ethnic Indonesians and people of
mixed race. Precise estimates of the relative sizes of these two groups are
not available, and we therefore added 50% of the Indonesian foreign-
born and their children to our estimate of immigrants with voting rights.
For France, we added the 91,000 Harki-Algerian Muslims who served in
the French colonial army—who came to France between 1962 and 1968
as well as, based on data provided by INSEE (2002), all persons born in
the so-called DOM TOM (De´partements et Territoires d’Outre Mer, i.e.,
the remnants of the French colonial empire; e.g., Guadeloupe, Martinique,
French Guyana, Re´union, and New Caledonia). We obtained an estimate
of the second generation for these groups by adding the percentage of
foreign-born 20 years prior to the current number of foreign-born from
these groups, that is, assuming that a generation later, the first generation
would have exactly reproduced itself. This method seems adequate be-
cause according to estimates by Solis Conseil (2009), there were, in 2009,
757,000 persons of DOM TOM origin in metropolitan France, which is
indeed about twice the number of first-generation persons born in the
DOM TOM according to the 1999 census (356,834). For the United King-
dom, we added all persons born in a Commonwealth country or in the
Republic of Ireland, who all have voting rights, regardless of nationality
15 The native inhabitants of the former Belgian Congo have never had a claim to
Belgian citizenship.
This content downloaded from 130.37.129.78 on Wed, 30 Oct 2013 10:36:22 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Citizenship Rights for Immigrants
1241
status. We do not need to further include the second generation from these
groups because they are already included in our naturalization figures
because of jus soli acquisition.16
The figures thus obtained were divided by the total population of the
country minus the foreign population to obtain the final estimate of im-
migrants with national voting rights as a share of the total electorate.
Ideally, we would of course need to calculate both immigrants with voting
rights and the total electorate on the basis of the population of 18-year-
olds and older, but because of data limitations, it is impossible to calculate
such age-specific data. Because the share of under-18-year-olds is higher
among immigrants, this implies that we somewhat overestimate the share
of immigrant voters, but we can assume that this bias is roughly stable
across time and across countries.
This, however, does not yet take into account local voting rights for
foreign citizens. For those cases with local voting rights for all foreigners
(Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, as well as the Netherlands from 1990
onward), we added the percentage of foreigners of all nationalities to the
share of immigrants with national voting rights to obtain the share of
immigrants with local voting rights. For EU countries with local voting
rights for EU citizens only, we added the percentage of foreigners from
EU countries (calculated on the basis of Eurostat 2010) to obtain the share
of immigrants with local voting rights.17
Table A1 gives the resulting percentage shares of the electorate of im-
migrant origin for the national and local polity levels for each country
and measurement year.
16 This procedure is only approximately accurate because some of the Commonwealth
born will have naturalized and are therefore already included in our cumulative nat-
uralization figures. However, against this, there are no data available on the second-
generation offspring of people of non-British descent who came to Britain in the
decolonization period carrying full British citizenship, because they acquired British
citizenship neither by regular naturalization nor by jus soli, but simply by being born
to a UK citizen. We assume that these two biases roughly cancel each other out. We
found data on the origin countries of the foreign-born population only for 2001 (Mi-
gration Information Source 2010). In that year, 55% of the foreign-born originated in
a Commonwealth country. Assuming that the share of the Commonwealth born among
all foreign-born has been roughly stable over time, we used this percentage to calculate
estimates of the Commonwealth-born population by multiplying the foreign-born pop-
ulation for each measurement year by a factor of .55.
17 Subtracting the UK Irish nationals, who are already included in the percentage of
immigrants with national voting rights.
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TABLE A1
Estimates of the Share of Voters of First- or Second-Generation Immigrant
Origin among the National and Local Electorates in 10 Countries, 1980–2008
1980 1990 2002 2008
National Local National Local National Local National Local
Austria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 .9 2.0 2.0 4.9 8.3 7.4 11.3
Belgium . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 .7 2.2 2.2 6.1 11.7 8.1 14.3
Denmark . . . . . . . . . . . .7 2.6 1.4 4.3 2.0 6.9 3.2 9.0
France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 2.5 4.8 4.8 7.3 9.2 9.9 11.9
Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 .2 .5 .5 1.8 4.9 2.8 5.7
Netherlands . . . . . . . . 2.5 2.5 4.8 9.1 9.5 13.8 10.3 14.7
Norway . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 2.3 1.1 4.4 3.4 7.8 5.1 11.5
Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 7.3 4.5 10.1 9.1 14.4 11.4 17.5
Switzerland . . . . . . . . . 3.0 3.0 5.2 5.2 8.6 8.6 11.9 11.9
United Kingdom . . . 2.1 2.1 4.3 4.3 6.7 8.3 10.2 12.6
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